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THE WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SHRIMP CASE
THAT CREATED A NEW WORLD ORDER
LAURA YAVITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
The approaches of international environmental law and
international trade law are fundamentally different: International
trade law is based on the premise of free trade whereas international
environmental law uses trade measures to enforce multilateral or
unilateral decisions. The World Trade Organization' has the only,
world-wide 3 mandatory and binding dispute settlement mechanism.
4
Therefore, unresolved environmental conflicts have great potential
for ending up before a WTO panel (since environmental disputes
often incite trade measures).
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade5
sovereign states have agreed not to impose restrictions on free trade
with certain limited exceptions. However, in many instances states
wish to protect the environment. The conflict will either occur by one
country imposing its own environmental standards on imported
products or by one or more countries invoking an environmental
agreement. This leads to a violation of GATT Article Ill if the
measure on imports and exports is discriminatory. Furthermore,
states are not allowed to impose quantitative restrictions on imports
under GATT Article XI. The GATT/WTO panels have so far not
invoked the "environmental exceptions" in GATT Article XX(b), (d)
*IBor Nielsen, Phd Research Fellow, University of Copenhagen; Candidata Juris
2001, University of Copenhagen; LL.M International Trade Law 1999, University of Arizona;
LL.B 1998, University of Copenhagen. The author would like to thank Professor David A.
Gantz for his assistance and inspiration in preparing this LL.M thesis.
'Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement).
2See David A. Gantz, Introduction to the World Trade System and Trade Laws
Protecting U.S. Business, 18 WHITrIER L. REv. 289,297 (1997).3When this thesis was written in 1999, there were 134 members of the WTO and
thirty were applying for membership. See Renato Ruggiero, Opening Remarks to the High
Level Symposium on Trade and the Environment available at
http://www.wto.org//english/tratope/envir..e/dgenv.htm. There are now 140 members. See
also, WTO in Brief, at http://www.wto.orgtenglish/thewtoe/whatis_e/inbriefe/inbr02.e.htm
(2001). 4Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
5General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex I A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994), [hereinafter GATF] (the two agreements are
identical to the articles in this paper; Article Ill, XI and XX).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. [VOL. 16:2
or (g)6 as a basis for trade measures that are otherwise inconsistent
with GATT. None of the GATT/WTO cases regarding the
environmental exceptions involved a multilateral environmental
agreement (hereinafter MEA) or a bilateral agreement. The panels
have concluded, in dicta, that in order for a country to utilize the
exception the country must invoke a bilateral/multilateral agreement
or show evidence of a good faith effort to negotiate such an
agreement.7 Apart from this requirement, the measure must also
meet other requirements of the exception.
One problem is that environmental conflicts are resolved by
trade experts on the WTO panels. These panelists are not educated in
resolving environmental issues. The panels will review non-
requested material from non-governmental organizations.
8
Furthermore, the panels do not review the policy itself,9 but only the
manner in which that measure is applied.10 This is still an
unfortunate situation for the environment since the WTO is set up to
promote free trade."1 Therefore, free trade principles are very likely
to prevail over environmental concerns if the two are in conflict
before the WTO. A more positive approach for pro-environmental
nations is to pursue the dicta in the Shrimp case to promote changes
in the world order.
Most countries are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of
6GATT Article XX states as follows:
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction of international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... (d) necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies
operated under paragraph 4 of Article I1 and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks
and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; ... (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT Article XX supra note 5.
7General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, SDIO/R-37S/200 33 I.L.M.
1122 (1991) [hereinafter Cigarettes]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, not adopted,
DS21/R-39S/155, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna I]; General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade; Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
not adopted, DS29/R, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna 11]; World Trade Organization
Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in the United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter Gasoline]; World
Trade Organization: Report on the Panel on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 1998 WL 720123 [hereinafter Shrimp].
8See generally Shrimp, 1998 WL 720123, 110 at *30.
9The panels review the policy to see if it falls within one of the sub-paragraphs of the
exception. See discussion infra section VI.
'0See World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 35
I.L.M. 603, 625 (1996)[hereinafter Gasoline].
"See WTO preamble, 33 I.L.M., at 1144.
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binding environmental agreements. This paper asserts that in the
WTO these environmental agreements would be given the "teeth"
and that pro-environmental countries can use the WTO to effectively
force their reluctant neighbors to negotiate more environmentally
friendly agreements by initiating "good faith efforts" toward such
agreements.
In addition to outlining the suggested "new environmental
world order," this paper provides an illustrative example involving
the resolution of an incipient conflict. The conflict is about the
testing of cosmetics on animals and how the European Union wants
to prohibit it.12 A prohibition of animal testing would probably be
considered illegal by the WTO under GATT Article XI.
The relevant cases are briefly introduced in Section III. In
Section IV, the relevant articles of GATT are introduced. Section V
gives an introduction to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, known as the DSU. Section
VI is about the application of GATT Article XX(b). In Section VII,
the ways of invoking the exception are described. Section VIII
describes how this new approach by the WTO panels will affect the
world order. Section IX outlines the conflict regarding prohibition of
animal testing in the cosmetics sector. Finally, Section X concludes
by discussing the intense conflict between the environment and free
trade.
II. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this paper is to outline "the new
environmental world order." The term "the new environmental world
order" is used because the WTO provides a new opportunity for a
reconciliation between trade and the environment with the Shrimp
case. Naturally, environmental issues that are not trade related will
not be addressed. In outlining the present state of the law, particular
focus is given to animal welfare affected adversely by trade and
production methods. This often means that the embargoed product
itself is not different from other products of that kind. However, the
manner in which it is produced causes adverse effects on animals.
Thus, products are distinguished based on non-product-related
processes and production methods; NPR-PPMs.'3
2
Council Directive 93/35/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L. 151) 32.
1 See Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling The Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L.
477,491-492 (1999).
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Animal welfare is usually covered by GATT Article XX(b).
Subject to the requirement that such measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: .... (b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health. 14
However, GATT Articles XX(d) and (g) are also
environmental exceptions.' 5  Therefore, the application of these
provisions are analyzed when useful for the application of Article
XX(b). Cases regarding other sub-sections are used in the chapeau
analysis because the "chapeau" is applied in the same way regardless
of what sub-section of Article XX is at stake.1
6
The new environmental world order can only be considered
as such if new panels intend to follow the dicta of previous cases.
Therefore, a separate analysis of these precedents in the WTO is
made in Section V, with related references throughout the paper.
The analysis does not focus on the substantive obligations of
Article II and XI of GATT. However, these cases arise out of a
violation of these articles and a brief description of the rules is
provided in Section 4.
Professor Robert E. Hudec divides unilateral measures into
altruistic and level-playing-field measures. 17 The altruistic measures
are designed to make foreign countries change their environmental
policies, whereas the level-playing-field measures are protectionist
measures for rich nations to off-set any competitive disadvantage.'
8
This paper will only discuss the altruistic measures when examples of
potential conflicts are given. 19 However, the conflict between rich
and poor nations will be taken into account when necessary.
1
4
GATT Article XX, supra note 5.
"
5See generally id.
16Shrimp, supra note 7, at 147, 41.
1
7
Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GA 7T and Multilateral
Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341, 361
n.140 (1996) (citing Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures
Against Foreign Environmental Practices 1-2 (unpublished manuscript) (presented at a
conference in Washington, D.C. entitled "Domestic Policy Divergence in an Integrated World




When an example is given it is assumed that the policy will fall under GATT
Article XX(b).
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III. THE PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS
Five cases20 are used in the analysis given the fact that they
are consistent in their approach to the sequence of steps21 for the
application of GATT Article XX. Three of these cases are GATT
cases.
Cigarettes (1990) involved Thailand and the US in a dispute
over a discriminatory cigarette program enacted by the Thai
government. 22 The measure, which was a discriminatory excise tax, a
business tax and a municipal tax, was found inconsistent with GATT
Article XI: 1.23 The Thai government invoked GATT Article XX(b)
24
because cigarettes are damaging to human health.25 However, the
measure was not "necessary" under the requirements of the
"necessity test" set out by the Panel, and the Panel thus rejected the
application of Article XX(b).26
Tuna I (1991) arose out of a dispute over a dolphin-friendly
tuna fishing program enacted by the United States government. 27 The
complaint was brought by Mexico because its tuna was embargoed
by the United States.28 The direct embargo of tuna caught with
dolphin unsafe methods is known as the primary nation embargo.
29
Moreover, the United States also embargoed countries that purchased
tuna from a country subject to the primary nation embargo.30 This
indirect embargo is the intermediary nation embargo.3' The Panel
concluded that both the primary and the intermediary embargo were
inconsistent with GATT Article XI: 1.32 The United States invoked
Articles XX(b) and (g) exceptions for the primary embargo. The
Panel also concluded that the measure was not justified under either
of the sub-sections. 33 Moreover, the intermediary embargo was not
20See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
Thai Restrictions on Importation of and internal Taxes on Cigarettes, SDIO/R-37S/200 33
I.L.M. 1122(1991) [hereinafter Cigarettes]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, not adopted, DS2 I /R
- 39S/I 55,30 1.L.M. 1594 (1991)[hereinafter Tuna 1]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, not adopted,
DS29/R, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna 11]; Gasoline, supra note 10; Shrimp, supra
note 7.
2For an explanation of the sequence of steps, see infra section \ 1.










3Tuna 1, 30 I.L.M., at 1623.33
id.
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justified under GATT Article XX(d).34
The Netherlands and the EEC later brought a complaint
against the United States regarding the primary and intermediary
embargo of tuna by the United States which led to the Tuna II panel
report 1994.35 As in Tuna I, the Panel in Tuna II held that both the
primary and intermediary embargo were inconsistent with GATT
Article XI and neither of the embargoes were justified under GATT
Article XX(b), (g) or (d).
Since the advent of the WTO, the GATT Article XX issue
has been litigated twice. The Gasoline Panel Report was issued in
1996 after Brazil and Venezuela complained about the discriminatory
standards for imported gasoline in the United States.37 The Panel
held that the gasoline program was inconsistent with Article Ill and
could not be justified under Article XX(b), (g) or (d).38 However, the
Appellate Body held that the measure fell within Article XX(g), but
failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
39
In the Shrimp case, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
brought a complaint against the United States in 1998.40 The
Appellate Body held that the United States embargo of shrimp
harvested with methods that harmed sea turtles was inconsistent with
Article X. 4 ' The measure did fall within Article XX(g), but failed to
meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
42
In the following sections, the cases will be analyzed and
further relevant description of the cases is outlined in the analysis.
IV. THE LAWS
The relevant laws in this paper have remained unchanged
with the advent of the WTO. However, during the negotiations of the
Uruguay Round the Committee on Trade and the Environment was
set up to address trade-related environmental issues.
Following is a brief introduction to the relevant articles of
GATT. First, the substantive obligations under GATT are addressed
followed by the exceptions. The laws appear to be easy to apply.






'una 11, 33 l.L.M. 839 (1994).
36
1d., at 899.
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A. GATT Article Ill
In order to ensure free trade, domestic and imported products
are to be treated alike according to Article 111. 43 Tariffs are covered
by Article I, which sets forth "Most-Favored-Nation Treatment"
(hereinafter MEN), meaning that all members pay the same custom
duties as the most favored nation.44 Thus, tariff duties are not
regulated by Article III. However, other types of taxes (a tariff duty
is also a tax) are covered by Article III. Article III lays down the
principle of "National Treatment" which means that a country cannot
use an internal tax or other internal measure to discriminate against
imported products. 4 It is not only internal taxes that cannot be used
to discriminate in favor of "like" domestic products, but also internal
charges, laws, regulations and other req' irernents affecting their
internal sale. The language reads as follows.
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
46transportation, distribution or use.
When countries make cross-border attempts to protect the
environment the measures will violate the National Treatment
requirement if they are viewed as discriminatory.47 The typical
scenario is illustrated in the Gasoline case where the United States
adopted a program for reformulating gasoline in order to protect the
environment. However, the panel found that domestic and imported
gasoline were "like" products and that importers were treated less
favorably than domestic producers under the terms of the program,
thus violating GATT Article I1:4.4
B. GATT Article XI
Countries can also protect domestic industry by imposing
43GATT Article li.
44d., article I.
"See generally id.., article Ill.
461d., at article 111:4.
47
Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 10, at 6.8.
48See generally Gasoline, 35 I.L.M., at 603.
491d., at 633.
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measures other than taxes or discriminatory regulations on products.
Therefore, Article XI eliminates any kind of quantitative restrictions
on imports.50 Many trade agreements have this kind of mechanism
and history has shown that countries can be extremely creative in
their attempts to protect their domestic industry. In the GATT-
regime, the Beef Hormones case51 describes how the European Union
tried to protect its market against foreign meat products by
prohibiting imports from Canada and the United States.52 Other
examples are the dolphin-friendly tuna fishing programs in the United
States that restricted imports of tuna from other countries which
brought about Tuna 153 and Tuna 11.54 The Shrimp case involved the
United States who embargoed shrimp that were not harvested with
sea-turtle-safe methods.55 Each of theses measures were viewed as a
violation of Article XI.
C. GATT Article XX(b)
This exception is designed to ensure that "legitimate"
concerns of human, animal or plant life or health can be protected by
the contracting parties.56 In attempting to exercise such protection,
countries may violate their substantive obligations under GATT.
Therefore, when a law that conflicts with the substantive obligations
under GATT is challenged in the WTO, the country can invoke
Article XX(b). 7 However, the exception is not applied by the panels
unless certain criteria are met.
In order to obtain examination of the exception by a panel, a
party needs to expressly invoke the exception.58 The party invoking
the exception bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that the
exception satisfies all the requirements for its invocation.
59
Furthermore, panels interpret the exception narrowly. 6  Further
clarification and analysis is provided in Section 6.
S°See GATT Article XI.
51EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS/48/AB/R, 1998 WL 25520 at *1 [hereinafter Beef Hormones].52
1d.
"Tuna 1, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
'Tuna 11, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
sSShrimp, 1998 WL 720123.
-'GATT Article XX(b).
SSee e.g. Cigarettes, supra note 7; Tuna 1, supra note 7; Tuna II, supra note 7;
Gasoline, supra note 7; Shrimp, supra note 7.
S"United States - Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984, B.I.S.D.
31 S/67,1 4.4.59Gasoline, 35 I.L.M., at 626.
6°See Tuna 11, 33 I.L.M., at 894.
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V. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
The pre-Uruguay dispute settlement mechanism was not
binding. The relevant articles of the GATT were Articles XXII and
XXIII. 1 The GATT 1947 encouraged solutions the contracting
parties could agree to: 62 Consultations, conciliation, good offices and
mediation.63 However, if the parties could not agree, a panel of three
to five panelists would be established.64 When the panel reports were
finished they could be adopted only by a consensus decision of the
contracting parties.65  Therefore, the losing party could block the
adoption of panel reports while enforcement through retaliation was
not an option because consensus of the parties was required.
A change occurred with the establishment of the WTO. In
the WTO-regime, the DSU is administrated by a Dispute Settlement
Body (hereinafter DSB) 66 which consists of all WTO members. As
described above, the parties are encouraged to find a solution they
can agree to before requesting the establishment of a panel. If the
parties cannot agree to a solution, a panel of three individuals will be
established.
67
When the panel report is finished, the DSB has several
options. First, if one of the parties chooses to appeal the decision the
case will be reviewed by a standing Appellate Body before any
further action is taken by the DSB.68 Second, the DSB can adopt the
report.6 9 Third, the DSB can by consensus decide not to adopt the
report.7 ° The Appellate Body report must be adopted by the DSB
unless it decides by consensus not to do so.71 WTO member states
must comply with the ruling of either the panel or the Appellate
Body. 2 The losing party has three choices." First, it may change its
measure in order to conform with the GATT.74 Second, it may pay
damages for keeping the illegal measure. 5 Third, it may subject
61The articles are still in force with the WTO.
62The WTO dispute settlement mechanism also prefers mutually acceptable
solutions. See DSU Article 3.7, 33 l.L.M. at 1227.
63Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement: The First Three Years, I J. INT'L ECON. L 199, 200 (1998).
64GATT, article XXIII:2.
OSteger & Hainsworth, supra note 63, at 200.
66DSU Article 2, 33 I.L.M., at 1226-1227.
67DSU Article 6 and Article 8, 33 I.L.M., at 1230-1232.




7 See DSU Article 19, 33 I.L.M., at 1237.
"See Gantz, supra note 2, at 297.
74DSU Article 22:2, 33 1.L.M., at 1239.
"Id.
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itself to unilateral retaliation approved by the DSB.76 However, the
DSU indicates a strong preference for member compliance.
77
According to the text of WTO Agreement Article IX:2, the
panels have no authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO
Agreement provisions. 78 However, there are practices developed by
panels that are followed by other panels. In prior GATT practice
there was no concept of stare decisis.79 However, the cases suggest
that adopted panel reports are followed as de facto precedent because
they create legitimate expectations among the contracting parties. 80
Conversely, panel reports not adopted have no legal status as
precedent to future panels but may still provide guidance if the
reasoning of the report is considered relevant.8' It is very difficult to
guess whether or not a future panel or Appellate Body will follow the
reasoning of a prior decision. It is a matter of a case-by-case
evaluation of the panelists in the two forums to decide what is to be
followed and what is not. However, as the Appellate Body stated, it
does create expectations among the contracting parties when a certain
method of reasoning or interpretation is used in a decision.
Therefore, it can be argued that the expectations become more
important with decisions that have consistently repeated statements or
interpretations.
It is, however, important to note that panels are ad hoc,
which means that different people are on different panels; whereas,
the Appellate Body are the same seven members (sitting in panels of
three). Therefore, the many different panelists will inevitably
represent more diverse views than the standing Appellate Body. The
panelists will not feel as bound by earlier decisions as the members of
the Appellate Body will of their own decisions. However, it could be
argued that the panelists will know that an appeal will be made and as
a matter of prestige seek to avoid reversal by the Appellate Body by
following earlier Appellate Body rulings.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF GATT ARTICLE XX(b)
The WTO is set up in order to promote free trade.
8 2
Therefore, exceptions are kept as limited as possible. Free trade
experts on the panels are not against the environment per se, but it is
their responsibility to solve disputes in accordance with the objectives
76
1d.; Gantz, supra note 2, at 297.
"See DSU Article 21:1, 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
78WTO Agreement, 33 .LM. at 1148.
79






See generally WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M., at 1144.
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of the GATT. The most explicit result of this issue is that the panels
interpret GATT Article XX exception narrowly. This is, however,
sometimes justified on a weak foundation of precedent. In Tuna I,
the Panel concluded that it had been the practice of previous panels to
interpret the exception narrowly.8 3 However, Charnovitz explains
that until Tuna I this practice did not exist. Charnovitz further
explains that the argumentation for establishing this practice is very
weak because the Panel cited two previous Panel reports that did not
include any language suggesting a narrow interpretation.
8 4
The next case to address the issue was Tuna II. In that case,
the Panel concluded that it had been a "long-standing practice" to
interpret GATT Article XX narrowly.85 As Charnovitz points out, it
is critical that the Panel in its reasoning for this interpretation cites
the same two unsupportive cases as the Tuna I Panel. 6 In reality,
there is no reason to speculate whether the exception should be
interpreted in another way. The text of the exception does not
incorporate any language that supports this interpretation, but the
overriding free trade purpose of the GATT/WTO undoubtedly
explains why it is unlikely that a future Panel will interpret the
exception differently. 87 Ultimately, the interpretation has no other
meaning than panels will establish ways of narrowing down the area
of exceptions even without a good argument for doing so.
88
The panels have concluded that the analysis of GATT Article
XX has a specific sequence of steps:
In order that the justifying protection of GATT
Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at
issue must not only come under one or another of
the particular exceptions -- sections (a) to (j) --
listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the
requirements imposed by the opening clauses of
Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two
tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under XX(g);
second, further appraisal of the same measure
83Tuna 1, 30 I.L.M., at 1619.
8
4
Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689,
720 (1998).
"Tuna II, 33 I.L.M. 894.
"Chamovitz, supra note 84, at 720.
9
7
1t is argued that the narrow interpretation should be abandoned on the grounds that
there is no foundation for doing so. Furthermore, the narrow construction seems unnecessary
when considering the other requirements in the exception. See Christoph T. Feddersen,
Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic Relations: The Public Morals of
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under the introductory clauses of Article XX.89
This was first decided by the Appellate Body in the Gasoline
case. In the later Shrimp case, the Panel started the analysis with the
chapeau and this method was rejected by the Appellate Body. This is
an example of a method of analysis, developed by the prior Panels,
that will be followed in the future. It is highly unlikely that a future
panel will try to reverse this practice, and if they do it is virtually
certain that the Appellate Body will reject the practice as in Shrimp.90
The appropriate steps for the application of Article XX(b) are
as follows: First, whether the policy falls within the range of policies
to protect human, animal or plant life or health,91 Second, whether
the measure (that is inconsistent with the substantive obligations
under GATT) is "necessary" to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, 92 Third, whether the measure can be justified under the
chapeau of Article XX.93 This is also a practice that is followed by
other panels and is considered as a standard method for the
application of GATT Article XX(b).94 It is also worth noting that the
sequence of steps regarding sub-section (b) was decided before the
Gasoline case. Gasoline explained that the chapeau analysis is the
"last" part of the sequence of steps in the analysis.95 Therefore, when
the analysis of whether a measure falls within sub-section (b) was
created, the chapeau analysis was not yet developed in the manner it
is today. This explains why there seems to be a "gray area" between
what belongs in the chapeau analysis and what belongs in the
"necessity" analysis. However, the five cases analyzed in this paper
follow this sequence of steps even if they were first expressed in
Gasoline. Since no Panel so far has analyzed a case where a sub-
section (b) measure was decided under the chapeau analysis, there is
no clarification of the issue. It follows from the sequence of steps
that a future Panel will apply the chapeau analysis in the same
manner, regardless of what sub-section the measure falls within.96 In
the following, each step of the application of GATT Article XX(b) is
discussed separately.
"See Shrimp, 118, 1998 WL 720123, at *32.
50
1he WTO Secretariat also supports this isi, i practice future panels will follow in
its note regarding the application of the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX. See
GATT/WTO Secretariat, GA77/WTO Dispute Settlement practice Relating to Article U%
Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) ofGATT, WT/CTE1W/53/Rev.1, at 3,4 (Oct. 26, 1998) [hereinafter
WTO Note].
91id.92ld.
93See e.g., Tuna 11, 5.29,33 L.M., at 895.
"See WTO Note, supra note 90, at 12.
9
See generally Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603.
9See e.g., Shrimp, 1998 WL 720123, 147, at *41.
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A. Policy
When a measure is found inconsistent with one of the
substantive obligations under GATT, the first step in invoking the
exception is to determine whether it falls within the policy goal of
protecting human, animal or plant life or health. This is an "easy"
test to apply. In Cigarettes, the Panel concluded a measure taken in
order to reduce the consumption of cigarettes was within the policy
area.97 In Tuna II, both parties agreed that the protection of dolphin
life was within the policy area.98
In Tuna I and Tuna II it was discussed whether a measure
could be applied outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking
the measure. In Tuna I, the Panel concluded, on the basis of the
drafters' intent, that GATT Article XX(b) could only be applied
within the jurisdiction of the importing country.99  This seems
completely irrational for two obvious reasons. First, the effect of a
measure to protect the animals would not exist outside the
jurisdiction of the country and thus, it would not be very effective.
Second, the measure would probably undermine the country's own
industry when some production methods are prohibited within the
jurisdiction but those products (that might be cheaper) still can enter
the country.
Furthermore, GATT Article XX(e) refers to products made
with prison labor and this naturally relates to products from other
countries.' ° Therefore, there is no rational basis for claiming that
GATT Article XX(b) should only apply within the jurisdiction of the
country taking the measure.
B. Necessary
The "necessity test" is not a test of whether the policy itself is
necessary but whether or not the measure is necessary to achieve the
policy goal. 0 1 Therefore, after a Panel has concluded that a policy
goal falls within Article XX(b), the measure itself is reviewed.'° So
far, none of the Panels have accepted the necessity of a measure
otherwise inconsistent with one of the substantive provisions of
GATT.
In Cigarettes, the Panel concluded that "the import
restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be
97Cigarettes, 73, 30 I.L.M., at 1137.
"Tuna 11, 5.30, 33 I.L.M., at 895.
9 runa , 5.26, 30 1.L.M., at 1620.
'O°GATT Article XX(e).
'01See e.g. Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 5.25; Cigarettes, supra note 7, at 73.
""2See WTO Note, supra note 90, at 13-14.
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'necessary' in terms of article XX(b) only if there were no alternative
measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to
achieve its health policy objectives."' '3  Since there were both
inconsistent and consistent measures available to the Thai
government, the Panel held that the measure did not meet the
"necessity test."1°4
The "necessity test" was also applied in Tuna I as an
alternative basis for the extraterritorial jurisdiction rejection. 0 5 The
Panel followed prior practice when stating, "[t]his section of Article
XX was intended to allow contracting parties to impose trade
restrictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to
pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such
inconsistencies were unavoidable."'A The Panel implicitly went on
to the next test: Whether a consistent or less inconsistent measure was
available. The Panel held that a consistent measure was not pursued
by the US. In particular, the US did not try to negotiate any
international cooperative arrangements for protecting dolphins.'07
Furthermore, the measure linked the incidental dolphin taking rate of
Mexico to the taking rate of the US during the same period. 108 This
meant that Mexican fishermen could not know what the rate was
until the period was over, when it was too late to comply.'0 9 This
unpredictable system was not considered "necessary" by the Panel.'°
Both arguments pose legitimate concerns. First, the US did later
conclude an agreement"' with Mexico regarding dolphin-friendly
tuna fishing methods which, of course, is a better and more fair way
of approaching the issue. Second, the US should not be allowed to
make completely unpredictable standards for the Mexican fishermen.
In Tuna HI, the Panel used the same necessity test as the
previous Panels. 112  The issue was divided into two parts: the
intermediary and the primary nation embargo. The intermediary
nation embargo was aimed at countries that imported tuna from
countries that did not have dolphin programs comparable to those of
the United States regardless of the importing country's dolphin
0O3Cigarettes, 75, 30 I.L.M., at 1138.
'4d., at 181.
-0 See Tuna 1, 1 5.28, at *40.
'06Cigarettes, 74, 30 L.L.M.,at 1138.




1t The agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
1208 (Raj Bhala ed., Michie 1996).
"
2
See Tuna I1, 5.35, 33 I.L.M., at 896-897.
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programs. 13 The Panel held that the intermediary nation embargo
did not further the policy objectives of the US because the importing
country did not have any influence on the exporting country's
policies. 14 Therefore, the measure was not necessary in order to
achieve the policy goal of the US." 5 Furthermore, the primary
nation embargo was not "necessary" because the Panel did not wish
to impair the GATT by allowing embargoes that will only further the
policy objective if the policies are changed in the importing
country." The Panel did not make the test by which it is analyzed
whether or not a less inconsistent measure or a consistent measure
was available. In short, the Panel viewed unilateral measures as
being outside the scope of the Article XX exceptions. With the
Shrimp case, the approach was changed. The Shrimp Appellate Body




The Chapeau analysis is the second half of the two-tier
analysis; the first is to justify the measure under one of the sub-
sections.
Under the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the first two
cases were resolved under the chapeau." 8 This paper only discusses
the newest five cases where the subsections of Article XX are
analyzed first, followed by the chapeau analysis. Of these cases, the
Gasoline case is the first to analyze the chapeau because it is the first
case where a subsection of Article XX is accepted. Therefore, the
chapeau analysis is limited to the Gasoline and Shrimp cases. Both
of these Appellate Body Reports addressed Article XX(g). 119
However, these guidelines are from the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism and thus are "new" cases that presumably create strong
precedents for future Panels considering Article XX(b). As pointed
out in this paper, the chapeau analysis is the same regardless of what
sub-paragraph the Panel considers.
Perhaps, the acceptance of one of the sub-sections indicates
the panelists' "good faith" adherence to the new preamble of the
WTO. The WTO preamble almost repeats the language of the GATT
1947, which states, "Recognizing that [the contracting parties']
" 3See generally id.
141d.
"'1d.,1 5.36, at 897.
"61d., 5.37, at 897.
1
7
See Appleton, supra note 13, at 491.
1
8
See WTO Note, supra note 90, at 4.
"
9
See Gasoline, supra note 7; Shrimp, supra note 7.
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relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be
conducted with a view to ... develop[] the full use of resources of the
world...... 120 However, the WTO-Agreement preamble includes a
specific reference to the environment: "[W]hile allowing for the
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objectives of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment....'.121 However, since the application of
Article XX(g) is not the focus of this paper the particular
circumstances that lead to acceptance of the sub-section are not
outlined and therefore this assumption is not supported or
analyzed. 122  When mentioning the differences between the
preambles, it is also significant that the chapeau of GATT 1994
Article XX is unchanged from GATT 1947 and the term
"environment" is nowhere used in GATT 1994. Thus, panelists have
no guidelines when it comes to Article XX chapeau analysis.
The chapeau is the last test to ensure that the exceptions are
not misused.123 However, it is not a test that questions the measure
itself, "but rather the manner in which that measure is applied." 24 In
the Shrimp case, the United States argued: "If a measure
differentiates between countries based on a rationale legitimately
connected with the policy of an Article XX exception, rather than for
protectionist reasons, the measure does not amount to an abuse of the
applicable Article XX exception." 125 The Appellate Body responded
to this by stating that provisional justification under Article XX(g)
does not automatically justify it under the chapeau as well.1
26
This might seem obvious given the sequence of steps
described earlier in this paper. However, it gives a good indication
that the Panels take precedent seriously when it comes to attempts of
creative arguments for invoking the exception. Furthermore, it
suggests that policy objectives are not for review under the chapeau.
The chapeau analysis is an objective analysis of whether or not the
measure could be applied in a manner that did not conflict with the
chapeau, or conflicted less with the chapeau. This may seem very
close to the "necessity test" as described above.
2 1
The two latest cases have been decided on the basis of how a
'2°GAT" Preamble, supra note 5.
121
WTO Preamble, 33 I.L.M., at 1144.
'2However, the differences between the GATT 1947 preamble and the WTO
preamble are outlined in the chapeau analysis in Shrimp. See Shrimp, 152,1998 WL 720123,
at *42-43.
'2See Gasoline, 35 I.L.M., at 626-633.
1241d., at 626.




127The "necessity test" is the test of whether a measure less inconsistent or
inconsistent with the GATT can be found in order to achieve the policy goals.
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measure was applied because the measure itself did satisfy the
requirements of sub-section (g). When reading the chapeau, it seems
very confusing how to decide whether a measure satisfies its
requirements. However, the Gasoline and Shrimp cases clarify the
issue a great deal. In the following section, the Gasoline chapeau
analysis is outlined followed by the Shrimp chapeau analysis.
1. The Gasoline Chapeau Analysis
The analysis begins with explaining that the measure cannot
be accepted if it constitutes (a) "arbitrary discrimination" between
countries where the same conditions prevail; (b) "unjustifiable
discrimination;" or (c) disguised restriction on international trade.
2
However, the Appellate Body does not separate the three
requirements in its analysis. The language reads as follows:
"'Arbitrary discrimination', 'unjustifiable discrimination' and
'disguised restriction' on international trade may, accordingly, be
read side- by -side; they impart meaning to one another."
1 29 When
applying the above analysis, the Appellate Body states that
alternative courses of action that did not discriminate between
domestic and imported gasoline were available to the United States in
implementing regulations in order to reduce pollution.
3 ° The United
States argued that the reason for its discrimination was that it would
be very difficult to verify the correct refinery of origin for gasoline
since it is a fungible commodity. 3' Furthermore, the United States
argued that it could not prove in each instance that it could not verify
information and enforce its regulation. 32 However, the Appellate
Body found: "There are, as the Panel Report found, established
techniques for checking, verification assessment and enforcement of
data relating to imported goods....' 133 Furthermore, the Appellate
Body took into consideration whether or not the United States could
have established individual refinery baselines for foreign refiners.
The United States responded that "'in the absence of refinery
cooperation and the possible absence of foreign government
cooperation as well', it was unlikely that the auditors would be able
to conduct the on-site audit reviews necessary to establish even the
overall quality of refineries....' 3  The Appellate Body concluded
that "the United States had not pursued the possibility of entering into






Gasoline, supra note 7, at * 19.
134 d"
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cooperative arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and
Brazil or, if it had, not to the point where it encountered governments
that were unwilling to cooperate.' 35 Moreover, the record "does not
reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the United states to
enter into appropriate procedures in cooperation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil....'. 136 In addition, the United
States did not take into consideration the costs and burdens entailed
by immediate compliance with a statutory baseline when it came to
foreign producers but only with regard to domestic producers.
137
The conclusion, for the purpose of this paper, is that the chapeau
analysis opened up the possibility of invoking the exception if
cooperative arrangements were sought. This concept is expanded in
the following case.
2. The Shrimp Chapeau Analysis
Before the actual analysis, the Appellate Body noted that the
preamble of the WTO included a reference to sustainable
development and that the Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE) is set up to try and identify and solve the relationship between
trade and the environment. The Appellate Body then stated: "[W]e
must fulfill our responsibility in this specific case, which is to
interpret the existing language of the chapeau of Article XX by
determining its ordinary meaning ... [which means that] [i]t is proper
for us to take into account, as part of the context of the chapeau, the
specific language of the preamble to the WTO Agreement....' ' i38 The
Appellate Body then turns to some general considerations of whether
exceptions are limited in the sense that they should not, by abusive
exercise, be allowed to impair the rights of the contracting parties.'
39
The Appellate Body, contrary to the Gasoline case, separates
the three criteria in its analysis.
2(a). Unjustifiable Discrimination
The analysis begins with "unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail." Within this
category it is examined whether other countries can have their own
sea-turtle program or need to adopt essentially the same program as





13 7See id.,at *20.
UsShrimp, supra note 7, 155, at *44.
'39See generally id., 159, at *45.
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The actual application of the measure, through the
implementation of the 1996 Guidelines and the
regulatory practice of administrators, requires
other WTO Members to adopt a regulatory
program that is not merely comparable, but rather
essentially the same, as that applied to the United
States shrimp trawl vessels. Thus, the effect of
the application of Section 609 is to establish a
rigid and unbending standard by which United
States officials determine whether or not countries
will be certified, thus granting or refusing other
countries the right to export shrimp to the United
States. Other specific policies and measures that
an exporting country may have adopted for the
protection and conservation of sea turtles are not
taken into account, in practice, be the
administrators making the comparability
determination. 140
The Appellate Body then concludes:
However, it is not acceptable, in international
trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an
economic embargo to require other Members to
adopt essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy
goal, as that in force within that Member's
territory, without taking into consideration
different conditions which may occur in the
territories of those other Members.'14
Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted that:
[S]hrimp caught using methods identical to those
employed in the United States have been
excluded from the United States market solely
because they have been caught in waters of
countries that have not been certified by the
United States. The resulting situation is difficult
to reconcile with the declared policy objective of
protecting and conserving sea turtles. This
suggests to us that this measure, in its application,
t401d., 163, at *47.
1411d., 164, at *47.
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is more concerned with effectively influencing
WTO Members to adopt essentially the same
comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied
by the United States to its domestic shrimp
trawlers, even though many of those Members
may be differently situated. We believe that
discrimination results not only when countries in
which the same conditions prevail are differently
treated, but also when the application of the
measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry
into the appropriateness of the regulatory program
for the conditions prevailing in those exporting
countries."142
Another aspect of unjustifiable discrimination is the failure to
engage the exporting countries in across-the-board negotiations. This
is the most important part for the purpose of this paper. The
Appellate Body found that "[a]propos this failure to have prior
recourse to diplomacy as an instrument of environmental protection
policy, which produces discriminatory impacts on countries exporting
shrimp to the United States with which no international agreements
are reached or even seriously attempted, a number of points must be
made.' 143 The points of relevance are first, that the Congress of the
United States set forth requirements to negotiate international
agreements when enacting Section 609.144 Second, that the WTO
Members, through CTE and other international forums, recognize the
need for international cooperation when environmental issues are
transboundary. Sea turtles are a highly migratory species and are
therefore a transboundary environmental issue. 45 Third, that the
United States did conclude a regional international agreement. The
fact that the United States concluded an agreement shows that co-
operative arrangements are available. In support for this argument, it
was noted that the parties to the agreement observed their rights and
obligations under the WTO agreement.146
In addition, the Appellate Body stressed that different
countries were given different periods of "phase in" periods, which
differentiates among the Contracting Parties. 47 The lengths of this
"phase in" were also linked to the effort by the United States to
'
42
1d.. 165, at *47.
'
43
Id., 167, at *48.
'4See 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (also referred to as Section 609); id., at 167, *48-49.
14See Shrimp, supra note 7,1168, at *49-50.
'46See id., n 169-70, at *50-51.
14'Id., 4M 173-74, at *52.
[VOL. 16:2
THE WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT
transfer the required technology. 148  The Appellate Body then
concluded that the differences between the countries in the
application of the measure "in their cumulative effect ... constitute
'unjustifiable discrimination' ... within the meaning of the chapeau of
Article XX."14
2(b). Arbitrary Discrimination
The next test applied by the Appellate Body was the
"arbitrary discrimination" test. First, it concluded that the unbending
standard that requires foreign countries to adopt a program that is
essentially identical to the United States' program without taking
special conditions for each country into consideration also constitutes
"arbitrary discrimination" within the meaning of the 
chapeau. 150
Second, the Appellate body considered the certification process for
those countries that wished to export shrimp to the United States.
The Appellate Body stated that:
[W]ith respect to neither type of certification
under section 609(b)(2) is there a transparent,
predictable certification process that is followed
by the competent United States government
officials. The certification processes under
Section 609 consist principally of administrative
ex parte inquiry or verification by staff of the
Office of Marine Conservation in the Department
of State with staff of the United States National
Marine Fisheries Service (footnote omitted).
With respect to both types of certification, there is
no formal opportunity for an applicant country to
be heard, or to respond to any argument that may
be made against it, in the course of the
certification process before a decision to grant or
to deny certification is made. Moreover, no
formal written, reasoned decision, whether of
acceptance or rejection, is rendered on
applications for either type of certification ... No
procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial
of an application is provided.
4ld., 175, at *53 (the technology is called Turtle Excluder Devices (hereinafter
TED)).
"
491d., 176, at *53.
"5Jd., 177, at *53.
151Shrimp, supra note 7, 1168, at *54.
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The Appellate body critiques this on the basis that there
seems to be no way that exporting countries can be certain that the
guidelines are applied in "a fair and just manner...." '  Thus, it
appears that countries that "are rejected are denied basic fairness and
due process, and are discriminated against, vis-,-vis those Members
which are granted certification." '1 53 Furthermore, the Appellate Body
explains that due process is required by the provisions of Article X:3
and that the requirement also extends to the application of a measure
that purports to be an exception to the substantial obligations under
GATT.'m In addition, Article X:3 establishes minimum standards for
transparency and procedural fairness. These requirements are not
met either. 155  Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that the
application of the measure, for the reasons stated above, constituted
"arbitrary discrimination." 
56
2(c). Disguised Restriction on International Trade
The final test should have been whether or not the application
of the measure constituted a "disguised restriction on international
trade." However, the Appellate Body decided that since neither of
the two first tests were met, the last test was irrelevant. 5
As described in Section II, this paper only discusses altruistic
measures. Therefore, the paper gives examples of "honest" attempts
of invoking the exception. The reason for this approach is that if a
country wants to achieve an environmental policy goal, it can not
achieve this through discriminatory treatment of foreign products or
among imported products. As the previous cases show, protectionist
and/or discriminatory measures are not accepted by the Panels. The
reason is that it will undermine the free trade system. Secondly, it
may be argued that if a country truly wishes to ensure a certain
environmental policy goal, it cannot at the same time treat countries
differently because this will not promote the policy goal. This
thought shows that common sense leads to the same result as the very
complicated rules regarding the application of Article XX(b).
It can be argued that the Appellate Body did not apply this
last test in order to keep an opportunity open for rejecting the
application of the exception in a future case. This is certainly
persuasive if prior creativity and reasoning of the Panels is
considered, especially when considering the language cited in
:'
2
1d.' 181, at "54.
"41d., 182, at *54.
5'See id., 183, at *55.
'S61d.. 184, at *55.157Shrimp, supra note 7, $ 184, at *55.
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subsection 2(a), where the Appellate Body held that the "cumulative
effect" constituted "unjustifiable discrimination." It is very difficult
to predict what will constitute "unjustifiable discrimination" in the
future when the "cumulated effect" is a subjective measure with no
precise guidelines. Furthermore, the Appellate Body applied the two
first tests but not the last. It appears that if the first test was not met,
there is no need to apply the next. In this light it seems strange that
the last test was not applied. However, as above, it can be argued that
none of previous cases actually involved an "honest" attempt at
improving the environmental problem at stake. Therefore, the very
strict approach of the Panels actually helps define what and how a
future measure will be found acceptable by the Panels and also have
an "actual" effect on the environmental problem.
VII. GETTING THE EXCEPTION INVOKED
This section describes how an environmental measure in the
future could survive a WTO challenge. As outlined above, there are
very specific requirements for a measure under each step of applying
Article XX(b). The following options for getting the exception
invoked addresses each criteria.
A. Invoking a Multilateral or Bilateral Agreement
In the scenario where all parties to the dispute are signatories
to an environmental agreement and the agreement itself authorizes
trade barriers when violated, the invocation of the exception should
be accepted by a future panel according to the dicta by the Appellate
Body in both Gasoline and Shrimp in the chapeau analysis that points
out the lack of negotiation of co-operative agreements. The
Appellate Body in the Shrimp case described the effort by the United
States to conclude agreements as: "The Inter-American convention
demonstrates the conviction of its signatories, including the United
States, that consensual and multilateral procedures are available and
feasible for the establishment of programs for the conservation of sea
turtles."158 Furthermore, in section VI(B), the Tuna I Panel stated
that a measure consistent with the GATT would be a
bilateral/multilateral agreement. From this, it follows that if a such
agreement is concluded, a future panel will accept the measure as
justified under both the "necessity test" and the chapeau test. As
pointed out earlier in section VI(B), it is evident that since the tuna
cases were written long before the recent Shrimp and Gasoline cases
that the practice of applying the "necessity test" and the chapeau test
5'
5 See id., 170, at *51.
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has changed somewhat changed over the years. Thus, unilateral
measures are not as restricted as earlier. In particular, if an
agreement is invoked or proposed, the measure does not appear
unilateral and may more easily be accepted by a future panel.15 9 This
illustrates how the very strict "necessity test" may be easier to apply
with the interpretation of unilateral measures from the Shrimp case. "
Therefore, it is evident that both tests will be satisfied with such an
agreement since it would be considered a consistent measure under
the "necessity test" and applied in a manner consistent with the
chapeau of Article XX.
Michael Lennard, however, suggests another result. Lennard
contests that in the event where both or all parties are signatories to
both an environmental agreement and the WTO, one agreement may
take precedence at international law. His result is based upon the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 16 1 and concludes that the
"later treaty" will prevail.162 This approach is contrary to the
underlying philosophy of this paper; that the efficient dispute
settlement mechanism in the WTO can help the enforcement of
environmental agreements.
It can be argued that the Panels will do their best to never
permit the exception from ever being invoked and that much
creativity might be used in preventing it. The Appellate Body in the
Shrimp case referred to import prohibitions as the "heaviest weapon"
of trade measures. 63  On the other hand, when the Panels so
consistently have urged countries to negotiate such agreements, it
appears that a Panel should follow previous practice. The Appellate
Body in the Shrimp case explained that the environment is of
significance to the Members and that it urged that WTO members
conclude agreements to protect the sea turtles. 64 Therefore, the
conclusion is that if a country invokes an international environmental
agreement as a basis for utilizing the exception, it will probably
prevail.
Another aspect of this analysis is the environmental
agreement itself. In order to determine how far a country has to go in
order to show that an import prohibition is a valid and necessary
outcome of the dispute, the analysis will have to separate "hard
'
59
See Appleton, supra note 13, at 493.
16
0
But cf id., at 482 (Appleton contests that the necessity test is not less strict with
the Shrimp case and that Article XX(g) is easier to invoke than (b). Thus, it is easier to protect
animals than humans).
161See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
'62See Michael Lennard, The World Trade Organization and Disputes Involving
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 5 EUR. ENvTL. L. REv. 306, 308 (1996).
163See Shrimp, supra note 7. 1171, at *53.
164See id., 1 185, at *55.
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law' 165 and "soft law." 66 The easy case is "hard law" with reference
to trade measures, including embargoes, as enforcement. This type of
agreement will fall within the category analyzed above, which should
prevail in a WTO case. Other agreements, such as "soft law" and
"hard law" with no enforcement mechanism or a different
enforcement mechanism than trade measures, are analyzed below.
B. Good Faith Effort
If the agreement regulates the subject matter but does not
refer to trade measures as an enforcement mechanism, the parties
need to show that negotiation and other mechanisms failed in order to
embargo goods from the country at fault. This analysis might be
along the lines of the good faith effort analysis in negotiating an
agreement. As pointed out earlier, the Panels will try to avoid
authorizing trade barriers. However, alternative enforcement
mechanisms are very unwelcome, such as when Canada in April 1995
impounded a Spanish trawler and cut the nets of others. 1
67
1. Good Faith Effort in Negotiating an Agreement
In a situation where a county is not a party to an agreement
that covers the subject matter and fails to negotiate a
bilateral/multilateral agreement, the issue is whether the country
made a "good faith effort"in negotiating such an agreement. This is
suggested in both the Gasoline case and the Shrimp case. In section
VI, (C)(1), the Gasoline Appellate Body not only suggested that the
conclusion of an environmental agreement would satisfy the
requirements of Article XX, but that it noted that the United States
failed to show that it even tried to negotiate a such agreement. In
section VI(C)(2)(a), the Shrimp Appellate Body noted that the United
States did not reach or seriously attempt to reach an environmental
agreement.
The threshold for this "good faith effort" is of course high
because the Panels will try to avoid authorization of trade barriers.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case held that "the
record also does not show that the appellant, the United States,
attempted to have recourse to such international mechanisms as exist
'65Hard law is most often laid down in treaties , .,i obligate the countries to enforce
them. See generally Patricia Birnie, International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for
Present and Future Needs. in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 51, 53
(Andrew Hurrel & Benedict Kingbury eds., 1992).
'6Soft law is usually laid down in declarations or resolutions and is not binding on
the countries. See id.
16'See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 346.
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to achieve cooperative efforts to protect and conserve sea turtles
(footnote omitted) before imposing the ban."' 6  The existing
mechanisms are described in the footnote to this citation. The
footnote explains that the United States did not address the issue in
the already existing MEAs and that in some cases the United States is
not a signatory to the existing agreements. 169 This indicates that
practically every reasonable step must be taken in order to show a
good faith effort.
In order to analyze what the requirement must be, it is
divided into two possible scenarios. One where the country tries to
negotiate an agreement about the protection of, e.g. dolphins from
tuna fishing methods, and the country is a party to a big fish-
protection MEA that only regulates fish and not dolphins. In this
case the country may have to amend the fish MEA to include
protection of dolphins in order to show that a "good faith effort" is
made. The other scenario is where the country is not a party to any
agreement of the slightest relevance to the subject matter.
In the scenario where a country is a signatory to an existing
agreement, it is useful to realize whether this MEA is relevant. In the
Shrimp case, the Appellate Body refers to the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES). 170 However, the CITES is not relevant in this case, since it
is not trade in sea turtles the United States will sanction. It is the
method used to harvest shrimp that causes the sea turtles' death. The
Appellate Body probably did not notice the irrelevance of the CITES
and the meaning is more likely to be that the country must address the
issue in relevant forums. However, the next question must be
whether the country must try to amend these existing agreements.
The United States Congress took the approach that the United
States might need to show that a "good faith effort" required an
amendment of existing MEAs when it enacted the law to prohibit
shrimp harvested with methods that could harm the sea turtles.
17 ' As
described above, a future panel will try to avoid authorizing trade
barriers. Therefore, when a future panel seeks to decide what a
country must do in order to show "good faith effort," it will most
likely assume that all existing MEAs, that is of some relevance and
the country is a signatory to in the first place, must be amended. The
fact that the United States Congress assumes that amendments are the
criteria and thus "proves" that countries can make the effort supports
the assumption that all MEAs must be amended. However, the
16 Shrimp, supra note 7, at 171, *51.
'"Id., 171 n.174, at *51 n.174.
"Old.; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3. 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
171See 16 U.S.C. § 1573 (also referred to as section 609).
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Panels must consider a "good faith effort" to amend the MEAs in the
light of the actual and very complicated procedure of amendments. 72
Therefore, if a result cannot achieved within a reasonable time limit,
"good faith effort" must be established. In reality, that means that a
MEA probably cannot be amended because there are too many
signatories; thus, amending MEAs is merely a theoretical issue.
In the scenario where the country is not a party to the MEA,
the requirement will probably not be to first try and become a
member and thereafter attempt to amend the agreement. This will be
a too far reaching task because it can always be argued that another
agreement could be of relevance if it were amended. In this light, the
task is almost impossible and very time and money consuming.
Therefore, the requirement must be to obtain membership in forums
where the issue is covered.
2. Good Faith Effort Regarding an Already Existing
Agreement
The introduction to this section explained the scenario where
an agreement exists but trade sanctions are not included as
enforcement mechanisms. The extreme result of lack of legitimate
and reasonable enforcement mechanisms is illustrated in Canada's
violent self-help enforcement. 7 3 Common sense must make anyone
realize that this is not an attractive way of resolving a dispute.
Therefore, a future panel is likely to find that a certain amount of
negotiation as to how to resolve the dispute must be considered a
"good faith effort" if the proposal is reasonable. As outlined above,
an amendment can only be required if it can be achieved within a
reasonable time frame. Furthermore, if a country shows that it did its
best in trying to negotiate a solution but is blocked by the other party,
the country cannot achieve more in diplomatic procedures. A higher
threshold would be to ask for the impossible and to reward the
country at fault for blocking negotiation and solution. The
conclusion must therefore be that the country must show that it did its
best in negotiating a solution before it embargoed the goods from the
country at fault, assuming the proposal was reasonable. This result
appears very attractive given the fact that the embargoed country
already acknowledged the policy goal by entering an agreement. A
country should not be "rewarded" for signing an agreement it does
not intend to keep. On the contrary, it is more fair to force the
country to comply with its written policy intention.
1
72
See generally Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective
International Environmental Agreements, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 144, 146-49 (Andrew Hurrel & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
"
3
See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 346.
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3. Socio-economics Aspects of Good Faith
As outlined in section VI(B), the Appellate Body in the
Gasoline case pointed out that the United States should consider the
costs and burdens for the exporting country entailed by immediate
compliance with the measure. The Appellate Body also explained
that it considers the language of chapeau: "between countries where
the same conditions prevail" as referring to conditions between
importing and exporting countries as well as conditions between
exporting countries. In short, all countries are to be given the same
treatment. This is further elaborated in the Shrimp case in section
VI(C)(2)(a). The Appellate Body stated that different conditions for
the exporting countries needs to be taken into consideration.
This brings a socio-economics aspect into the good faith
effort. Not all countries can afford to buy new equipment or start
producing things with new technology or whatever is needed to avoid
adverse environmental impact. Therefore, the negotiating country
should undertake a study on the specific conditions in different
countries or groups of countries. In reality, this means that if a
wealthy nation wants to negotiate an agreement that will be a
financial burden on a less wealthy nation, the wealthy nation needs to
make an analysis of what it needs in order to comply with its
proposed agreement.
In short, a proposed agreement must be structured in a
manner that will consider the needs of each country or groups of
countries need; socially and financially. The less wealthy countries
shall be offered assistance to buy new equipment; offered transfer of
technology, offered assistance in developing new methods of
structuring the specific industry, etc., in order to achieve
environmental goals.
4. Due Process Aspects of Good Faith
The due process requirement is described very specifically in
the Shrimp case. The essence of the "good faith effort" analysis is
that the country proposing an agreement needs to show that the
agreement was a fair agreement with fair application procedures.
Furthermore, the proposal itself must meet certain standards.
In section VI(C)(2)(a) the Appellate body explains that if a
country already has policies and measures to protect the sea turtles,
they should be taken into account. This means that when an
agreement is proposed, it will not meet the test under the chapeau
analysis if it does not give the other parties any room for having other
programs that also achieve the policy goals. However, this cannot be
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stretched to the extreme case where a country has a policy program
that is either very non-functioning or too weak to achieve the goal.
This analysis probably belongs under the "necessity test" given the
fact that this test ensures that the measure is "necessary" in order to
achieve the policy goal.
Another aspect of showing that the agreement was fair and
reasonable is described in section VI(C)(2)(b) where the Appellate
Body in the Shrimp case analyzed how the procedure of certification
was built up. This analysis has two aspects. First, the proposed
agreement must have high standards of "fairness" regarding the
process for import approval.' 74 Second, the proposal itself must live
up to certain standards of "fairness" in order to be negotiated in good
faith. This aspect is, of course, not explicitly required by the
Appellate Body. However, when analyzing how the exception could
be invoked, all possible requirements must be outlined in order to
show that everything that could be done, according to holdings and
dicta, is done.
The first aspect regarding the application of the measure as
proposed in an agreement is fairly straight forward to understand.
According to the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case the agreement
must set forth guidelines that are to be 175 applied 176 in "a fair and just
manner." In short, the requirement for a fair application of a measure
is that it does not discriminate among the Members. 177 First, the
measure must have a "transparent, predictable certification
process." 178  This is fairly easy for a country to achieve. The
agreement shall have a system that allows all parties to the agreement
to export the item when certified by the imported country. The
certification process must be designed in a manner that allows all
signatories to the agreement equal procedures which means that all
the signatories will submit their application for import certification to
the same government agency. The agency will thereafter have to
make a "formal written, reasoned decision." 179 The decision shall be
174 In Shrimp, the United States had a certification program for import of shrimp. In
Gasoline, the United States had a similar approval system. For the purpose of this paper, it is
assumed that when a country wants to make a minimum standard for an imported item, it will
set up a certification system in order to assure that the exporting country complies with the
standard.
d 5 'he Appellate Body states this when analyzing how the measure is applied.
However, in order to comply with the requirement, it is evident that an agreement must include
an explanation of how it intends to apply a measure in a certain manner.
1
76
1t is, of course, very important that the guidelines will also be applied in the
manner described in the proposed agreement. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that
the proposed agreement will be applied in the manner it is intended in the agreement. If the
agreement is applied in another manner, it will probably not survive the chapeau analysis unless
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made on the basis of objective criteria that are available for the
applicant to obtain information about. Furthermore, the decision
shall be sent to the applicant' 80 in addition to publication in a
register.'
8'
If an application needs further investigation, the applicant
shall be assured a right to be heard and to submit further
documentation. 18 2 When a country applies, it may be of importance
whether the country has a program to ensure the policy. As outlined
above, these individual programs need to be taken into account when
a country analyzes whether it will grant certification. In this respect,
the country shall set forth guidelines of how it evaluates other
countries' individual efforts to ensure the policy. The individual
efforts must be evaluated on the basis of how efficient they are.
Finally, the agreement must set forth a procedure for review or appeal
for denied certification.'
8 3
The second aspect of this "fairness" requirement is important
when a country wants to show that it made a good faith effort when
proposing the agreement to the Members. First, the agreement must
be proposed to the Members who would be affected by the
measure. 184 This is further supported by the underlying philosophy of
non-discriminatory treatment of the Members. However, even if this
requirement seems very basic and very hard to ignore, no country has
had the idealism to actually fulfill their obligations. In reality, it
comes down to a change in the approach of negotiating
environmental agreements. Therefore, in order to get the exception
invoked in a possible WTO case, the country must send out an
invitation to join negotiation of the proposed agreement to all
possibly affected nations. Furthermore, the Members are not to be
given differential treatment when it comes to trade-offs. Trade-offs
means that most countries will require transfer of technology and
phase-in periods, etc. The balance between the previously described
requirement of taking different conditions for different countries into
account and treating all countries in a non-discriminatory manner
may be characterized as a fundamentally impossible task given the
contradictory requirements. However, given the fact that previous
Panels have interpreted this contradictory language of the chapeau
'5 0Cf Shrimp, supra note 7, 180, at *54 (the Appellate Body criticized that the
applicant was not sufficiently notified on the outcome of the application. Those granted
certification were notified by publication in the Federal Register and denials were equally not
notified specifically. Thus, denials were notified by not being published on the "approval list').
1810r a similar appropriate place for publication.
'g2See Shrimp, supra note 7, 180, at *54.
'WSee id.
"4Cf id, at 170, *51 (the Appellate Body noted that an agreement was negotiated
with some Members affected by the policy, but not all the affected Members were offered the
same treatment).
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and not pointed this fundamental contradiction out, it can only be
required that the balance must be achieved to the highest extent
possible.
5. Other Commentators' View of Good Faith
The previous approach of commentators is that countries can
only prevail if they conclude an agreement. 85 Steve Charnovitz
discussed the issue regarding the current dispute between the United
States and EU over the EU import ban of fur bearing animals caught
in leghold traps.' s6 For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that
the issue falls within Article XX(b). t8 7 The EU and the United States
reached an agreement that essentially states that the countries
disagree. 8 8 Charnovitz argues that the situation is shaky; first,
because the agreement is only an agreement to disagree; second,
because the United States (or any other supplying country) could take
the dispute to the WTO.189 This paper shows that a "good faith
effort" is sufficient in order to prevail in the WTO, primarily based
on Shrimp. In this light, the EU would be able to prevail in a WTO
Panel in the leghold trap matter if the negotiation lived up to the
standard outlined in the previous section. This may, however, not be
the case because leghold traps are the least expensive method to use
when hunting for "fur." Thus estimated loses are high for the United
States. 190 Both nations are developed countries and the financial
analysis is very complicated. Chamovitz further argues that the
United States can argue, in a WTO dispute, that an embargo is
"unnecessary" because negotiation is more effective than
confrontation.19 1 This argument falls short on two grounds. First, the
embargo is "necessary" if no other methods can ensure the policy
goal; to avoid unnecessary suffering by trapping animals in leg-hold
traps. Second, because the agreement shows that negotiating was
conducted and if all the requirements from the sections in subsection
B are met, the negotiation was in good faith and that makes the EU
prevail in the WTO. However, as pointed out above, this last
assumption is merely an assumption.
'
83
Along the lines of Tuna I. See Tuna 1, supra note 22, 5.28, at *40.
'"Charnovitz, supra note 84, at 736-41.
"
7
See Peter V. Michaud, Caught in a Trap: The.European Union Leghold Trap
Debate, 6 MINN. . GLOBAL TRADE 355, 372-73 (1997). But see id., at 737.
't See International agreement in the form of an Agreed Minute between the
European Community and the United States of America on humane trapping standards -
Standards for humane trapping of specified terrestrial and semi-aquatic mammals, 1998 O.J. (L
219) 26, available at http://europa.eu.intJeur-lex document 298A0807(01).
"'Chamovitz, supra note 84, at 737.
'mSee Michaud, supra note 187, at 362. Whether or not the EU needs to transfer
funds to the United States falls outside the scope of this paper.
tg'Charnovitz, supra note 84, at 737.
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Appleton, however, agrees with the view that the Shrimp case
opens up for a possibility to have the exception invoked. He further
supports the conclusion that the Appellate Body in its report moved
away from the assumption that unilateral action cannot be taken to
further any environmental policy goals as the Tuna II Panel stated.
92
Interestingly, the United States has not yet chosen to utilize
the mechanism in the WTO to enforce environmental agreements.
After the tuna cases, the United States concluded an agreement with
Mexico and other Latin American countries. The Mexican
government still contends that the "dolphin safe" standard is an unfair
trade barrier and is considering bringing the case again. In response,
the Clinton Administration in 1997 ordered modifications to the
standard of which nets are allowed when fishing for tuna. However,
this change has been blocked by an amendment initiated by
environmentalists. 1
93
The interesting point is that the Clinton Administration
totally disregarded the strong position the United States will have in a
future dispute when it already has an agreement with Mexico. Maybe
the Clinton Administration acted so weakly for political reasons, such
as a lack of public awareness and interest for dolphins. The political
approach seems more likely given the fact that there has been no
effort to show that an agreement is already reached and the countries
at fault likely will lose a possible WTO case. However, there is one
weakness in the position of the United States; if the technology to
catch dolphins is not transferred in a manner that makes it possible
for the developing countries to bear the financial burden of acquiring
it, the United States may have to offer further assistance in order to
win the dispute in the WTO. Furthermore, the application of the
measure must be non-discriminatory.
The good faith analysis in this paper shows that even if a
country refuses to conclude an agreement, it can be forced to comply
with a unilateral measure or a standard reached in a
bilateral/multilateral agreement the country did not wish to become a
party to. In the following section, this result is compared to the usual
approach of customary international law.
6. Customary International Law and MEAs
Customary international law194 arises from state practice. In
the area of disputes over problems regarding animal welfare arising
192Appleton, supra note 13, at 491.
193Associated Press, Groups Sue to Enforce Dolphin Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug.
19, 1999, at A.
1
4See generally Anthony D'Amato, The Elements of Custom, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE WORLD ORDER 107, 107-9 (Bums H. Weston et al. eds., 1997).
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from a certain production method or by trade, there is very little
customary international law of relevance. The reason is simply that
these trade issues bring up new problems and there is no state
practice. However, there might be extreme cases where it is
considered a custom to treat animals in accordance with a certain
minimum standard. In the entire environmental area, there is a great
deal of customary international law of fundamental principles
underlying the entire system that is applicable to all environmental
subjects.' 95 This analysis of customary international law consists of
two parts. One part is an illustration of the differences between
"good faith effort" and customary international law in the sense that
in both cases a country is forced to comply with rules it did not enter
into by a written agreement. The other part is an analysis of how
customary international law can force compliance with a MEA
against a non-signatory party.
In the scenario of the MEAs, such as the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' 96 or the Montreal protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 197 customary international
law has an impact. Given the fact that customary international law
develops from state practice, agreements that have been ratified by
large numbers of states have a potential for developing into
customary international law. The more signatories to an agreement,
the greater potential for customary international law; this is also
called the concept of universal application. Furthermore, if the non-
signatories act as if they were bound by the agreement, the potential
custom is greater,
Geoffrey Palmer gives the example where a country that is
not a party to either of the above agreements allows unlimited
manufacture and use of chlorofluorocarbon. He argues that these
agreements are considered as customary international law. However,
his argument is based on a different theory than the above theory;
"almost universal" acceptance creates custom. Palmer's theory is
that there is a customary rule of duty not to harm another territory
contrary to the rights of that country. Therefore, the unlimited
manufacture and use of chlorofluorocarbons is illegal due to its
impact on other countries. 98 The example illustrates that the mere
9SSee Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY Ii, 12 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten
Engel eds., 1996).
"Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, UNEP
Doe. IG.53/5, 1990 U.K.T.S. I [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
"'Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
1990 U.K.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
I"oeoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 13, 13-14 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten
Engel eds., 1996).
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production and use is illegal in the world community outside the
GATT-regime.
In the above example, customary international law is more
likely to apply to that country if it tries to export the product.
Moreover, the export of the product is more critical than the domestic
use of the product; the country affects other nations more directly
when exporting its illegal activity. The export of the product will
take the issue inside the GATT-regime. Therefore, when a country
wants to export its illegal activity and a Member embargoes the
product, the exporting country should lose the case in the WTO
because the embargo is justified under Article XX, given the fact that
the Member complies with its obligations under a MEA that has
developed into customary international law. This will, of course,
only be the case if the embargo is non-discriminatory and fulfills the
other requirements outlined in this paper. The Shrimp Appellate
Body suggests that the Panels respect obligations under MEAs when
it refers to the CITES. MEAs are thus implicitly characterized as
customary international law that allows Members of WTO to respect
obligations under these and enforce them through trade barriers.
However, Fletcher and Lennard are of the opposite opinion. They
assume that if an MEA is enforced against a non-signatory party, the
non-signatory party will prevail in a WTO dispute.
This approach might have been correct at the time their
articles were written in 1996. However, with the recent Shrimp
Appellate Body Report in 1998, where it explicitly refers to the
CITES, the Panels would presumably respect obligations under
MEAs. This is also the opinion of EU and Canadian officials.200 If
the Panels furthermore are obligated to take into account whether the
non-signatory party was approached with a "good faith effort," this
would also make the environmental measure prevail in a WTO
dispute if they were actually negotiated with a "good faith effort."
20°
In reality, it must be presumed that a non-signatory to a MEA in the
size of, e.g. CITES was met with a "good faith effort" in respect to all
the criteria outlined in this paper except from the socio-economics
aspect.
This paper concludes that a country can be forced to comply
with a unilateral action under the "good faith effort" theory and with
customary international law under a MEA. In both cases, the country
did not voluntarily enter into an agreement. This is in opposition to
the usual approach of consent to the law of the states. However, the
199See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 358; Lennard supra note 162, at 308.
'm U.S. Signals It Will Not Seek Rewrite of WTO Rules for Environment, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 26, 1999, at I.
20t Assuming that the non-signatory party was not treated less favorably than other
signatory parties.
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principle is laid down in the Statute of the International court of
Justice Article 38:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply ... (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law....2 °2
Therefore, the conclusion is that a law can be enforced
against a party that did not voluntarily enter into an agreement;
however, there are variations of when a rule is a custom and when
not. It is generally assumed that a persistent objector cannot be
bound by a particular custom, 20 3 whereas a subsequent objector is
bound by the custom.204 Furthermore, some rules are considered so
important that they are customary international law by definition.
These rules are found especially in the human rights area. However,
rules regarding the humane treatment of animals can not be said to
have reached the status of customary international law.
The area of coverage under customary international law is
limited and develops very slowly. In contrast, this new approach in
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can develop very fast in
almost any area and thus create customary international law. This
hypothesis is also contradicted by other commentators. Fletcher
states that since it is impossible to take unilateral action, there will be
no evolution of customary international law. 205 Fletcher's reasoning
regarding that unilateral action creates new customary international
law is correct. However, according to Shrimp, the assumption that
unilateral action is impossible is probably out-dated.
The disadvantage of the generality of customs is also
overcome by the new WTO approach, since the agreements or
proposed agreements are specific. The conflict lies in the non-
acceptance of the rule by a state. Under customary international law,
the rule will not apply to an objector unless the rule is followed by all
(or almost all) states. Furthermore, unless the rule is very important,
the country will be excused if it objects from the beginning. In the
WTO system, a country can not object. If another country or any
other countries shows a "good faith effort," the other country is
deemed to comply with the rules. This leads to a very interesting
question: What if several countries makes different rules?
2Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 1946 U.K.T.S. 67.
203See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 .CJ. 116.2
04See id.
2wFletcher, supra note 13, at 354.
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7. Two or More Different Standards in the World
The obvious case is when a country unilaterally tries to make
a standard that conflicts with an already existing standard. According
to the Panels, the MEAs have so much weight that they will prevail.
But what if a country is unsatisfied with the low standard in a such
agreement? Would the country prevail if it paid for the extra costs?
In some cases, the country could probably just ask the other parties to
raise the standard if the requesting party paid the costs. However,
another party might want to block this process. The reason for the
opposition could very easily be that a country benefits from exporting
products that were prohibited. An example could be a future dispute
over humane trapping of fur-bearing animals. If a minimum rule
were laid down in a MEA and one country tried to implement a
higher standard, the country would offer funding to change this
production. If a country had a ten year phase out period where it was
allowed to use leg-hold traps and a country wanted the phase out
period shortened to five, two issues might arise. The first is the cost.
Even if funds are offered, the whole production system would have to
change and the country might not have an interest in that. If the new
trapping system were very expensive, people would have to form
corporations in order to be able to bear the costs of the new traps.
This may be against the free nature of the hunters and meet a lot of
objection. There could even be the prospect of losing the entire
industry because the hunters would oppose the system and refuse to
form groups. Therefore, a Panel is unlikely to accept a higher
standard if a country can show that the agreed phase out periods are
reasonable. The second issue is the scientific aspect. If it can be
proved that the environment is seriously threatened and fast action is
needed, the case is more likely to succeed.
Another issue is the conflict among regional groups.
Regionalism gives the potential for raising the standard within the
region. The reason is that when negotiating, the agreement the lowest
common denominator might be higher within the regional group.
206
Many agreements set out provisions which allow parties to make
higher standards within a region.20 7 However, as the analysis of the
"good faith effort" describes, in order for an embargo to prevail in the
WTO, the measure would have to meet those others' criteria.
Furthermore, regionalism might result in another conflict.
An example is the hypothetical situation where both the EU
and the United States adopt a program for the conservation of
2
'0Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, in
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dolphins when fishing for tuna.2°  Assume the EU and the United
States each have differing agreements with their primary trading
partners. Both programs have the same policy objectives and have
both survived in a WTO dispute brought by their respective trading
partners. The difference between the programs is the transferred
technology. The United States requires a U.S. patented fishing net
and the EU a Portuguese net. When the U.S. primary trading partners
want to export tuna to the EU, they meet an embargo. There are now
two different standards in the world. What will the outcome be of
such a case? The rational answer is that such an embargo is not legal
in the WTO. The main reason is that it is discriminating between
countries where the same policies exist. Furthermore, the countries
are not given credit for their own initiatives to protect the dolphins.
However, the issue is not clear. It can be argued that the original
cases brought against EU and United States will be of the opposite
result as first assumed, given the fact that it can be considered
"necessary" to define a specific patented net if other nets are on the
market. However, this might not be an issue in the litigation due to
the fact that the wealthy nations transfer technology and the less
wealthy countries do not challenge this particular issue. These
situations are unlikely to occur but remain possible.
VII. THE WTO APPROACH AND THE WORLD ORDER
When countries negotiate agreements or make policies, the
trade aspect is very persuasive. The illustrative example of this is the
WTO itself. In no other area have so many countries agreed on a
binding dispute settlement mechanism. Other examples are the EU,
NAFTA, etc. When negotiating environmental agreements, the cost
seems higher than the benefit. This is of course only economically.
However, most countries cannot afford to disregard economic
benefits; therefore, most agreements are only guidelines, since they
are dictated by the lowest common denominator.209 Fletcher states
that the world community does not see the environment as an
investment, like the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights21° in the WTO.211 However, there are
ways to encourage countries to reach agreements that are more
2 8There have been no negotiations between the EU and the United States because
they do not export tuna to each other.2
m9See generally Andrew Hurrel & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of
the Environment: An Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT i,
22 (Andrew Hurrel & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).21OAgreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31 [hereinafter TRIPS].
21 Fletcher, supra note 13, at 362-63.
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ambitious than countries initially wish. As mentioned in section
VII(B)(7), regional arrangements may raise the standard.
Furthermore, Peter H. Sand describes the mechanism as Selective
Incentives. 12 This is when a higher standard is reached by giving
some countries grandfather rights, long phase ins and by funding
transfers of technology.21 3 This occurs not only in North-South
negotiations but also in East-West negotiations.2 1 4 It seems like a
purposeful undermining of the whole agreement. However, the
approach is widely used. The WTO does also have these provisions
of phase ins for developing countries.
215
Another approach is used in the EU. Many laws do not
attempt to treat each country equally even though it would be easy to
define the developing countries in the EU. Instead, they are based on
each country's special circumstances.2t 6 The Shrimp Appellate Body
held that the special circumstances had to be taken into account when
showing the "good faith effort."2 17  This suggests that the WTO
Panels will follow the approach of the EU, to treat each country
according to its special circumstances, when a country shows a "good
faith effort." This approach is very favorable for the approached
countries since their special circumstances will be taken into account
to the fullest extent. Furthermore, the environmental agreement is
lifted up from the lowest common denominator.
The environment is actually much better off with this new
WTO approach. Under the traditional approach, a country can refuse
to become a party to an agreement or lower the standard drastically in
exchange for consent. Even if the agreement does evolve to
customary international law, there is likely to be no enforcement
mechanism. It can be argued that if a country refuses to become a
party to a high-prestige agreement, it is likely not to care about its
image in the world community and that is often the only punishment
actually available. In the WTO, a country cannot avoid the probable
consequences (embargoes) when a "good faith effort" to conclude an
agreement is rejected because the country might decide not to
become a party to the proposed agreement. However, this would be
rather self-destructive, since according to my theory the terms of the
proposed agreement will then be enforced without any funding or any
other favorable treatment. Therefore, there is no effective way out
for a country because trade sanctions are very effective. For a very
212Sand, supra note 206, at 42.
"31d.214
1d.
2"See e.g. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex I A, art. 27.2 6See Sand, supra note 206, at 43.217Shrimp, supra note 7, 164 at *47.
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rich country, the trade sanctions do not affect the it very much.
However, when a country decides what products to retaliate against,
it usually chooses industries that are politically sensitive. Thus, the
public relations impact may be worse than the trade sanction, as with
the recent banana dispute between the United States and the EU.
It is appropriate to ask whether trade sanctions are a desired
means of enforcement. As pointed out, they are very effective.
However, is that what the world community is best served by? One
the one hand, it is very unfortunate to have Canada taking
international law into its own hands because negotiations over fishing
rights failed."' Fletcher describes it as very unfortunate to have
Canada using "gunboat diplomacy," and this illustrates the need for
alternatives.219 On the other hand, trade restrictions are easier to bear
for a industrialized nation than a developing nation since developing
nations usually have only a few products to export. This is evident
even if the analysis shows that this new concept of "good faith effort"
will create a redistribution of wealth that will occur, e.g., by
transferring funds.
Another issue is whether this is imperialistic. The answer is
"yes." Yes, the rich countries will be able to dictate standards for the
environment. Even with the negative tone of the word
"imperialistic," the result is for the benefit of the world community in
the name of the environment, and also in the case of the developing
nations since they have a good option to get additional funds.
Another question is whether a country, by entering the WTO,
surrenders some of its sovereignty? Did the country give up the right
to embargo any products? Is it within the state's sovereignty to
decide that some products offend public morals? Chamovitz
discussed the complications of imposing one nations' morals on
another and referred to several commentators in the 
area.220
Economist Richard N. Cooper contends that citizens should not be
forced to purchase products that would offend their morals.
22' This
argument is always made in order to promote free trade because
people will then feel safe. That is also the reason why there are
always exceptions in free trade agreements. However, time has
shown that it is very difficult to invoke those exceptions.
222 It is
important to notice that the consumers are not "forced" to buy e.g.
hormone-full beef or furs trapped with leg-hold traps; they are merely
given a choice.
21 
8See section VII(B), supra p. 227.
219
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 346.
22'Chamovitz, supra note 84, at 732-33.
'24d., at 732.
m2including those relating to conservation of exhaustible resources and to protect,
human, animal and plant life and health.
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Arguments are also made against a moral exception.
Economists Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N Srinivasan oppose unilateral
actions unless the choice of ethical concern is adopted by others.223
The three main reasons are: First, the difference of values would
allow one country to sanction another. Second, larger (or more
wealthy) countries will have more power. Third, persuasion and
private action should be used to spread values, rather than
coercion. 224 These reasons support this paper's analysis; rich nations
will have the economic resources to negotiate more agreements and
offer to pay for improvements. As pointed out, this is not necessarily
negative but rather positive in the environmental area.
However, the question remains: Is it not a question of
sovereignty to create and protect public morals? The GATT/WTO
Panels have shown a shift from the early tuna cases to the Shrimp. In
Tuna I, a policy could only be enforced within the nation's own
jurisdiction.225 In Tuna II, a policy could be enforced outside the
nation's own jurisdiction. 226 The Shrimp case shows the additional
step by also mentioning the criteria for a possible validation of a
unilateral action. This shows a change in how these issues are
viewed. Furthermore, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
supports the concept of balancing national sovereignty with
responsibility for the environment:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.227
This principle is now considered customary international law.
In addition, Renato Ruggiero, former Director- General, WTO, said
in his opening speech to the High Level Symposium on Trade and the
Environment, that sovereignty is not at stake in the debate regarding
multilateral rules.228 Even though he only referred to agreements
M
2
Charnovitz, supra note 84, at 733.
2
4Id.
225See Tuni 1, 15.26, at *39.
n6See Tuna 11. 1 5.15, at *56.
27Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human environment, Jut
1972, Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.! at 3 (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 at 2-65.
2SRenato Ruggiero, Opening Remarks to the High Level Symposium on Trade and
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with positive acceptance, this analysis has shown that the sovereignty
at stake is the same: A limited power to create or maintain public
morals. Ruggiero further redefines sovereignty as extending national
sovereignty beyond the borders by multilateral trade and
environmental agreements.2 9 This supports the notion of Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration; national sovereignty is dependent
on others in a global world. The effect of other states' behavior is
evident, not only for transboundary pollution that can be seen with
the eye, but in all areas. Therefore, the concept of sovereignty in
environmental areas must be regarded as limited by the customary
practice.
As the power to dictate environmental standards becomes
more defined, it will be interesting to see how the countries will act.
It may be expected that countries will create new agreements since
the standard will be enforced anyway. Countries will want the
chance for a voice in the process instead of direct dictation. As
Ruggiero points out in his discussion of sovereignty:
The reality is that in today's interdependent world
it is only by remaining isolated - and by turning
away from international cooperation - that
countries surrender their sovereignty. We all
need to work towards stronger multilateral
institutions, not weaker ones, if we want the rule
of law and not the rule of the jungle.23 °
This supports the argument that the countries will have an
incentive to conclude more agreements. Furthermore, the Panels
demands that all existing forums must be addressed before the
unilateral action will prevail - if the existing forums can be addressed
within reasonable time. This gives a further incentive for the
members of the international community to become a member in
existing forums and make them stronger and more specific. The
overall cost-benefit analysis will easily show that it is cheaper and
easier to overcome to negotiate one agreement than negotiating all
the time. In addition, the EU and the U.S. might has the capability
(staff and finances) to negotiate many agreements, whereas this is
impossible for others. This uneven balance of powers can be used to
push even more for fewer but more comprehensive rounds of
negotiation, since the poor or small countries will be more than happy
to "get it over with" in one round of negotiations than all sorts of
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negotiation that is almost impossible to deal with. As pointed out
earlier, the poor countries will be interested in agreements because
they will receive funding for the changes they have to make in order
to live up to the new environmental area in the agreement. Thus, the
EU and the U.S. have the power to control this evolution since they
can afford negotiation all the time or push for more comprehensive
rounds of negotiation. It remains to be seen how those countries will
deal with this opportunity. Perhaps they will not negotiate as much
as the environmentalists will hope for. If this happens, it is likely to
happen for their own economic reasons; i.e. they have to fund the
changes. However, this will benefit another evolution; the money
could go back to them in the future because they start an expansion of
the markets of their own products when transferring the technology.
On the other hand, in MEAs the funding is shared more equally
2 3'
and this might be attractive to the U.S. and EU, instead of paying
everything themselves.
After this analysis, it may be of concern that the decisions are
made on something like an ad-hoc basis. The High Level
Symposium addressed the issue from a point of view shared by many
others; that there is not likely to be a global court with compulsory
jurisdiction on disputes like human rights, poverty and the
environment, at least in any of the existing forums. Given the
importance of trade and the existence of the WTO forum, these
conflicts are likely to be adjudicated inside the WTO regime, if at all.
Ruggiero expressed his vision of a counterpart to the WTO in a
"World Environmental Organization." 232 However, this vision might
be as naive as expecting the United Nations to have a mandatory and
binding dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, the Clinton
Administration signaled, after the Symposium, that it will not support
a rewrite of the WTO rules.2 33 Thus, the case-by case approach
continues.3 Interestingly, the Clinton Administration declared that
it has not fully worked out how trade rules could protect
environmental agreement against WTO challenges.235 The EU and
Canada also supported the existing regime, while relying on Shrimp
for protection of the environmental agreements. 236 The realistic
approach is that there will not be a change of rules in the area. Thus,
the Shrimp case may thus become the standard for the future.
S'See Sand, supra note 206, at 43.
a2Ruggiero, supra note 3.
"' S. Signals It Will Not Seek Rewrite of WTO Rules for Environment, supra note
193, at 20.
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LX. EXAMPLE OF CONFLICT: EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS IN THE
COSMETICS INDUSTRY
In today's world, testing cosmetics on animals is allowed. In
other areas than cosmetics it is even required by law. This seems
logical in the sense that humans demand a certain safety for products
that very easily can damage their health by being applied to lips,
faces, bodies, etc. However, the paradox is that more and more
consumers do not want animals to suffer in order to fulfill their
dreams of beauty, youth or wellness. Thus, some cosmetics
companies claim that they do not use animal testing.
The demand for products not tested on animals affects the
cosmetics industry in many ways. First, the companies will have to
test their products in order to sell them. Second, some consumers
require products not tested on animals. Finally, the industry would
be faced with complicated trade issues if the EU enacts a proposed
law that will prohibit animal testing, but also embargoes goods that
do not comply with the standard.
A. Objectives for this Example
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the approach of the
EU and the U.S. in animal testing of cosmetic products. The analysis
does not evaluate specific ingredients that may be prohibited in the
EU or the U.S. The specific ingredients could easily represent a trade
barrier that could end up in the WTO. However, this is a too far-
reaching analysis. Furthermore, the specific test methods are not
analyzed. Rather, the analysis is focused on the general requirement
of testing of products put on the markets and the limitations of animal
testing. Labeling issues are very important in marketing cosmetic
products but are not analyzed here.
This example does not offer a good illustration of all the
aspects of the "good faith effort" as described in this paper. The
limitation of this example is that the conflict (as with the leg-hold
trap conflict) describes a potential dispute between two industrialized
nations. Thus, a financial analysis of what funding the EU should
offer the United States if the EU embargoes all products tested on
animals, is a too far reaching task for this paper.
B. The Reality in the Cosmetics Industry
The main problem in the present situation is that there is no
international agreement on testing requirements and labeling.
Furthermore, labeling on the national level is very confusing and
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gives no answer as to whether the product was tested on animals.
This lack of consistency in labeling and lack of transparency in the
"actual" policy of a company creates great confusion among
consumers.
When a product is labeled with "The product is not tested on
animals," this might not be the whole truth. The product may have
been tested on animals by parent companies, contract testing
laboratories or ingredient suppliers.237 No cosmetics company can
claim that its ingredients have never been tested on animals. Almost
all products have been tested at some time by someone.23s
C. OECD and the Scientific State of In Vitro Testing Methods
The toxicity test is laid down in OECD guidelines. OECD
test guidelines set the international standard of what test methods are
scientifically accepted by both member and non-member countries.
239
The guidelines do not offer a valid in vitro testing method to
substitute for animal testing (in vivo).24°  Because governments
follow the OECD standard, these guidelines are actually blocking the
implementation of policies that prohibit animal testing in the
cosmetics industry.
The OECD guidelines develop very slowly because the
OECD operates on the basis of the consensus principle. Thus, the
lowest common denominator sets the standard.
D. The Laws
When a product is put on the market it must comply with
requirements of being a "safe" product. Therefore, it must be tested
according to the standards outlined in the law. Furthermore, there
may be restrictions on the use of animal testing.
1. European Union
The EU241 regulates consumer health in the cosmetics
2
7See U.S. Food and Drug Administration [hereinafter FDA], Cruelty Free-Not
Tested on Animals, available at http://vmcfsan.fda-gov/-dms/cos-226.html; World Animal Net,
Cosmetics Testing Industry Claims available at http://worldanimal.net/cos-claims.html.




See OECD Chemical Program, Chemical Testing, available at
http://www.oocd.org.
240See ALTWEB, Alternatives to Animal Experiments in the Cosmetic Sector,
available at http://www.sph.jhu.edu/,-altweb/seience/regs/cosmetic.htm. This paper gives an
excellent analysis of the state of development in in vitro testing in the OECD.241The different institutions; the Council, the Commission and the Parliament all
participate in the law making procedure. See generally HJALTE RASMUSSEN, EU RET I
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242 in Directive 76/768/EEC.2 43 Article two of the Directive
reads as follows: "Cosmetic products put on the market within the
Community must not be liable to cause damage to human health
when they are applied under normal conditions of use." This
Directive lays down a testing requirement, but testing on animals is
not specifically required. However, the official standard for toxicity
testing is the OECD guidelines. Directive 76/768/EEC is intended to
protect consumers. The later Directive 86/609/EEC244 affects the
toxicity testing standard in Directive 76/768/EEC. Directive
86/609/EEC article 7 (2) reads as follows: "An experiment shall not
be performed if another scientifically satisfactory method obtaining
the result sought, not entailing the use of an animal, is reasonable and
practically available." This is not an explicit conflict of laws but
rather two policies that go in different directions: Directive
76/768/EEC does not require in vivo toxicity testing, but it lays down
a requirement of safe products for the consumers. Thus, safety must
give the cosmetic industry the green light for conducting
scientifically approved toxicity testing as outlined by the OECD.
Therefore, Directive 86/609/EEC conflicts in limiting the area for in
vivo testing. However, the limitation is not total in the sense that it is
only prohibited if another method that is scientifically approved can
substitute. According to this analysis, an amendment of Directive
76/768/EEC was not needed in the sense that the two laws would
conflict, but an amendment was made; Directive 76/768/EEC was
amended by Directive 93/35/EEC.245
The amendment is a further step in the effort to limit in vivo
testing. The introduction to the Directive makes a reference to
Directive 86/609/EEC article 7 (2) and also prohibits in vivo testing
from January 1, 1998. As outlined above, a law regarding consumer
health should not prohibit the only validated testing method. This
was also the position taken by the EU. The amendment to article 4
(1) states that the Commission can postpone the date if in vitro testing
has not been validated, taking into account the OECD toxicity test
guidelines. If the Commission postpones the date, it must submit a
report by January 1, 1997 on progress made in validating in vitro
testing. Furthermore, the Commission shall submit an annual report
to the Parliament on progress in the area. The Commission decided to
postpone the prohibition from January 1, 1998 until June 30, 2000;
therefore, the Council amended Directive 76/768/EEC with Directive
KONTEKST 74-90 (Gad Jura 2d ed. 1995).
"'2Cosmetic issues are intra-Community matters because they concern the common
market policies.
2' 3Council Directive 76/768/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 169.
USCouncil Directive 86/609/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 358) 1.245Council Directive 93/35/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 151) 32.
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97/18/EEC.246  Directive 97/18/EEC article two outlines the
possibility of a further postponement if alternative measures are not
validated by January 1, 2000.
2. United States
The FDA has the authority to regulate cosmetics in the
U.S.247 However, the authority only covers products that are released
to the marketplace.248 The rules are essentially the same as in the EU.
The language of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(hereinafter FD&C Act) § 361 (a) states that a cosmetic is
"adulterated" if, "it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render it injurious to users under conditions of
use prescribed in the labeling thereof, or under such conditions of as
are customary or usual....249 Animal testing is not required but
regarded as necessary, when no other alternatives are validated, to
ensure consumers health.250 When a product has not been tested it
must be labeled: "WARNING--The safety of this product has not
been determined. ' 251 The limitation set forth by the Animal Welfare
Act 252 gives the same "weak" protection of animal testing as
Directive 86/609/EEC. The Animal Welfare Act § 1 (b)(2) states:
"[Miethods of testing that do not use animals are being and continue
to be developed which are faster, less expensive, and more accurate
than traditional animal experiments for some purposes and further
opportunities exist for the development of these methods of testing."
In the U.S., animal welfare has not been incorporated into the FD&C
Act. The only reference is in the Position Paper of 1992: "FDA
supports and adheres to the...Animal Welfare Act... .'253 Therefore,
there is no commitment by the Congress to cut off animal testing as
of a specific date, and the U.S. is therefore unlikely to prohibit animal
testing before the EU. First, it takes a long time to make such a law
go into force because the industry needs proper time to change its
production and testing methods. Second, the FDA took the same
position as the EU: In order to secure consumer health, alternative
testing methods must be validated before animal testing can be
prohibited. With the experience from the EU, it is evident that the
2 6Council Directive 97/18/EEC, 1997 O.J. (L 114) 43.247See FDA, FDA Authority Over Cosmetics, available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/
-dms/cos-206.html.2
Uld"
24921 U.S.C. § 361 (a).




2See Animal Welfare Act as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156.3
FDA Position Paper, supra note 250.
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industry and the government in the U.S. are working more slowly to
validate an in vitro testing method.
E. Good Intentions
In general, it can be argued that it is fashionable to be against
animal suffering in order to make humans more beautiful or look
younger or whatever the use of a cosmetic product may lead to.
Therefore, pressure from non-governmental organizations, the public,
etc., have led to "good intention statements" in both the EU and in the
U.S.
In the U.S., the FDA states:
FDA is currently working with various
government and private organizations to develop
alternatives to animal testing in assessing
cosmetic safety. Until such methods are proven
to be reliable and accepted by the scientific
community, FDA believes that the use of animals
is necessary to ensure the safety of cosmetics
products.
25A
In the EU, the effort is more ambitious, as laid down in
Directive 93/35/EEC. Not only are there plans to ban the in vivo
testing but the Commission can only postpone the plans if new
methods have not been developed "despite all reasonable endeavors."
When the date was changed from January 1, 1998 until June 30, 2000
the Parliament issued a Paper.255 The Parliament complains about the
Council's acceptance of the proposed postponement. The Parliament
raises the question of whether the Commission complied Directive
76/768/EEC article 4 (1)(i), as amended by Directive 93/35/EEC,
where the Commission has an obligation to assure that new test
methods are developed. The Parliament therefore urged that the
Commission make a proposal to prohibit the in vivo testing on
cosmetic products and ingredients from 1998 - and at the latest from
2000. The Parliament argues that until a validation is made, the
industry has 8,000 ingredients that are already tested. This final date
will make industry and the governments more anxious to develop an
2FDA Office of Cosmetics Fact Sheet, Animal Testing, available at
http://vmb.cfsan.fda.gov/--dms/cos-205.html.
255Committee on Environment, Health and Consumer Issues under the Parliament,
Paper: A Proposal in Response to the Annual Report on Improvement in in vitro Testing
Methods in the Cosmetic Sector 1996 (unpublished material) (on file with Kirsten Jensen,
Member of the European Parliament, Committee on Environment, Health and Consumer Issues
in 1998, also on file with the author).
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in vitro testing method. The Parliament also argues that the
Commission did not comply with the language "despite all reasonable
endeavors" because the annual reports from 1995 and 1996 did not
show any evidence of procedures that would try to validate in vitro
testing before 1998. Furthermore, the Parliament argues that no
international consent on testing methods needs to be reached in
Directive 93/35/EEC but the Commission violates Directive
86/609/EEC by trying to get this because it lays out that any
alternative should be used instead of animal testing. In addition, the
Parliament contends that the EU, without further hesitation, should
take advantage of the environmental concerns in the WTO and try to
change any policies the EU does not agree with.
The Paper from the Parliament illustrates the dilemmas in
prohibiting animal testing. First, when a final date is not set for
prohibition of in vivo testing, the industry, governments, and
scientists do not have a need to validate alternative testing methods.
Secondly, alternative testing methods should be available in order to
assure consumers' health, but the fact that 8,000 ingredients are
already available and some companies are "scientific proof' of that in
vitro testing is sufficient.25 6 However, the industry may argue that in
order to develop new products, they need access to more than the pre-
tested 8,000 products.
F. When the Prohibition Occurs
According to the Paper issued by the Parliament, the
Parliament points out that the Commission has not fulfilled its
obligations in trying to develop new testing methods. If the
Commission by January 1, 2000 has not presented a good faith effort
to the Parliament, it can be met by an order from the Court to fulfill
its obligations or maybe to set a final date for prohibiting animal
testing. Whether the Court will take into account the fact that
alternative testing methods are not validated is not easy to guess. It is
difficult for the Court to rely on another forum, such as the OECD,
when it makes a judgment. Moreover, the Parliament will argue that
there has been sufficient time to validate the alternative methods, and
the Commission has blocked the validation process by being
ineffective. Furthermore, the cosmetics industry has 8,000 already
tested ingredients and some companies are proof of that animal
testing is not necessary. The following analysis is based on the
assumption that animal testing will be prohibited by year 2000 and
that the testing methods are at the same state as now; in vitro testing
is widely used but not validated by the OECD.
2"6See e.g., The Body Shop - About Us, supra note 238.
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1. The Laws
Directive 97/18/EEC prohibits cosmetics tested on animals to
be marketed in the EU beginning June 30, 2000. This means that no
imported cosmetic products can be tested on animals as well. Such
an embargo of cosmetics will, of course, effectively make the foreign
producers bound by the Directive. Furthermore, the U.S. regulates
the issue in the FD&C Act section 381 (e)(1) which provides, "(A)
[C]osmetic intended for export shall not be deemed to be adulterated
or misbranded under this chapter if it-- (B) is not in conflict with the
laws of the country to which it is intended for export." Therefore, if a
U.S. company fails to comply with the EU Directive it fails to
comply with U.S. law as well. The consequence for the violation of
the FD&C Act is removal of the product from the market through the
Department of Justice. 257 Thus, it is evident that U.S. producers
would encourage their government to file a complaint in the WTO.
2. A Possible GATT/WTO Conflict
The following analysis is based on the assumption that the
U.S. Government actually will raise the case in the WTO. However,
there is a significant chance that the U.S. will not raise the case.
Politically, it would probably be very unpopular to be on the "wrong"
side of a conflict after being on the "right" side in the Tuna I and
Tuna II cases and the Shrimp case, given the fact that polls show that
90% of the American consumers have said they were willing to make
an extra effort to purchase products from companies which try to
protect the environment. 258 Therefore, winning the case in the WTO
could be losing in Washington, if the animal welfare groups joined
the anti-WTO coalition.25 9 Furthermore, companies might be very
reluctant to file a petition with the Trade Representative because they
do not want to create an image of wanting to torture animals. Many
companies create a positive image by doing the opposite; advocating
against animal testing.
260
The restriction on imports is a quantitative import restriction
and violates GATT Article XI. Therefore, the only way the EU can
win the case is if the measure can be justified under the General
Exceptions in Article XX or if it falls within the TBT Agreement.
This paper does not assess any possibilities of the outcome of the
case under the TBT Agreement, because this very complicated
25'FDA Office of Cosmetics Fact Sheet, supra note 251.
2
8
Michaud, supra note 187, at 376.
2'9See Charnovitz, supra note 84, at 739-40.
2 'See e.g., Email from Clinique, Consumer Communications, to Laura Nielsen (now
Yavitz) (May 6, 1999) (on file with author).
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agreement has never been litigated in the WTO.
The EU measure is likely to be justified under GATT Article
XX(b). As this paper has shown, the exception can be invoked if an
agreement is reached or if the EU has made a "good faith effort"
when trying to negotiate a such agreement. A serious attempt to
reach an agreement must presumably include an analysis of how
much American producers rely on animal testing. This paper has
shown that companies will not be put out of business by prohibiting
animal testing. However, companies could argue that in order to
develop new products that might be successful in the EU, they need
to have animal testing available. Furthermore, the argument may be
raised that this will affect small companies more than large since
large companies have more technology and resources available to
develop new methods. However, this argument might not hold
because many cosmetics companies send out their testing to
contractors in order to claim that they do not test on animals. The
solution may be that the exporting countries can agree to have the EU
fund additional testing over a period of time. This, of course, would
only be necessary when the exporting countries' testing methods are
unlawful in the EU. If the EU provides for funding or a central
agency to conduct testing until an OECD validation of alternative
testing methods is found, the EU is likely to win the case in the WTO
assuming that the other requirements outlined earlier in the analysis
are met; policy goals within Article XX(b), non-discriminatory
application and design of measure and measure necessary in order to
achieve policy goals. In addition, a case is unlikely to occur if the
two parties are negotiating the issue.
This analysis faces another potential difficulty: The
cosmetics sector as a whole must be interested in reaching agreement
or an international standard. If one country prohibits animal testing
unilaterally, it gives a comparative advantage to others because they
have better opportunities in developing new "wonder products"
because they can easier test new ingredients. However, companies
that develop these products using animal testing can not place them in
markets where animal testing is prohibited. The European Coalition
to end Animal Experiments argues that an international standard is
the solution. However, this standard also requires the cosmetics
sector to use the 8,000 already tested ingredients until a validation of
in vitro methods occurs.
261
261See European Coalition to end Animal Experiments available at
http://www.tierreehte.de/european-coalition/standard.details.htral.
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G. Alternative Solutions
The on-going theme in this discussion is that companies and
governments work too slowly in validating in vitro toxicity testing
and that there already exist 8,000 ingredients to work with until a
satisfactory method is found. Furthermore, some companies are
"scientifically proof' that animal testing is not needed. It seems
unnecessary to continue the testing when companies already can
produce safe products without animal testing. The problem is the
interaction of three different policies. First, the "old fashioned" laws
of safe products without a guideline of testing procedure. Second,
new and more humane animal protection laws. Third, the science.
The EU tried to conciliate the two first but could not find a
way to agree on a law that was not "scientifically validated."
Perhaps, there are some conservative scientists in high positions
holding back for new testing methods or maybe the governments and
the companies are just too inefficient to validate the already existing
in vitro methods. A solution might be to look at the factual situation
and accept that the scientists will not validate in vitro testing in the
near future, but that the cosmetic sector can test with invalidated
methods or use the already tested ingredients.
H. Conclusion
Both the US and the EU have the same requirements for safe
cosmetics products, but none of them require animal testing by law.
Furthermore, they have both incorporated humane animal testing
statements into their laws or into policies. However, neither of them
has found the will to date a prohibition of animal testing because the
testing methods are not scientifically validated. The EU has gone a
step further than the US by trying to prohibit animal testing from
June 30, 2000. Whether the Parliament will succeed in making the
prohibition go into force remains to be seen. However, nothing in the
WTO should prevent the EU from doing so if it follows all the steps
of the good faith effort as outlined in this paper.
The real conflict probably lies in the fear of having different
standards in testing among nations. This could give some countries a
comparative advantage in developing new products and keep some
companies out of the EU market if they test on animals. The
political will to create changes is encouraged by the populations both
in the EU and the US. However, law-makers cannot figure out how
to prohibit animal testing without an OECD guideline. The two
possible solutions are if the EU actually enacts the law to prohibit
animal testing (and wins a potential WTO dispute), or if countries
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agree to do so. If the EU enacts the law it will push very hard to get a
scientifically validated method in the OECD in order to make a
stronger case if a conflict arises in the WTO and also to avoid EU
companies falling behind in the development of new products. If the
world community, under the pressure of the consumers, decides to
ban animal testing on cosmetics, this process will go even faster and
no company will have an comparative advantage. Under such
circumstances, the scientists will have to come up with a solution. In
today's world this may seem like utopia. However, if the consumer
were aware of this very political, sophisticated game-playing, the
process might go even faster because it is a very sensitive political
area - especially in an election year with a Democratic candidate that
claims he is an environmentalist.
X. CONCLUSION
The intense conflict between the environment and free trade
may move toward resolution with the Shrimp case. This paper has
tried to demonstrate that if the dicta in the Shrimp case is followed
and combined with a further effort to achieve an environmental
policy goal without discriminatory impact, future panels are likely to
apply the exception.
If a country implores a MEA, it is very likely that it will get
the exception invoked. Furthermore, if a country shows that it made
a "good faith effort" in negotiating an agreement, it is likely to get the
exception invoked. However, as the analysis in this paper points out,
future panels will be reluctant to invoke the exception. Therefore, the
negotiating party must not only negotiate in good faith but also be
willing to show that the proposed agreement has a certain amount of
fairness and is non-discriminatory. The weakness of this "good faith
effort" analysis is that it is very difficult to predict whether the
negotiating party will have lived up to all the requirements of a future
panel. However, as the paper illustrates, the Appellate Body in the
Shrimp case moved toward recognition of unilateral measures if a
"good faith effort" is shown by the country that enacted a
environmental measure.
Another aspect of the Shrimp case is that it creates a new
environmental world order. With the lack of prospect of an
environmental world court, the Shrimp case is likely to set the
standard. This paper illustrates how the wealthy nations, by funding
changes in the less wealthy nations, can improve the environment by
using the mandatory and binding dispute settlement mechanism in the
WTO. Furthermore, the paper illustrates how this new environmental
world order will encourage countries to become a member of more
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environmental forums.
The potential conflict between the United States and the EU
regarding experimental animals in the cosmetics sector is also
outlined in this paper. There is no "real" solution to the problem
because a great deal depends on whether the OECD will approve in
vitro testing in the cosmetics industry. If, however, the EU
embargoes cosmetics tested on animals it is not certain that the
United States (or any other member) will bring the case in the WTO
because it is unpopular to be against animal rights. However, a future
case may be won by the EU if they live up to the standards for "good
faith effort" outlined in this paper.

